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ADDRESS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)
before the
Japanese-American Assembly
Shimada, Japan
Friday, September 15, 1967

U. S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS:
Properties, Problems, and Prospects

It is a long way from Washington to Shimada but
Mrs. Mansfield and I were delighted with the opportunity to make
the journey.

As we anticipated on the basis of past v i sits, a

brief exposure to Japanese hospitality has served to dissolve the
great distances.

We are happy to be with you and I am deeply moved

by the privilege of addressing this distinguished gathering.
Each of us who is in attendance has come to Shimada
for a different complex of reasons.

Yet I believe we are also

drawn here by a common considerati on.

It is that we attach a high

significance to the preservation of good relations between Japan
and the United States.

Most of us are old enough to remember a

time and pain when these relations had deteriorated to such a
degree that they were, in the end, consumed by war.

We can

remember the gulf of devastation over which it was necessary to
try to build a bridge of conciliation.
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After the conflict, we did try and we managed-Japanese and Americans--to construct that bridge.

For two decades,

effective ties have been maintained between our countries.

They

are ties which have enriched our lives and contributed to the prosperity and progress of both nations.

They are ties which have been

a mighty factor in the preservation of the peace of the Pacific.
I think the question which should engage us most
profoundly at this time is whether we can continue in the pattern
of the past two decades.

Can the effectiveness of the U.S.-Japanese

relationship persist, in the decade ahead, even as the ties themselves are woven into new forms for new times?
If the source of U. S.-Japanese relations were solely
contacts among those attending this Japanese-American Assembly, the
question would pose no dilemmas.

Without any hesitation, the pro-

perties of U. S.-Japanese relations could then be described as
excellent, the problems as negligible and the prospects as unlimited.
The same would be true if it were simply a matter of
commerce between Japan and the United States.

The two nations buy

and sell from one another with great liberality.

Current trade is

at a new high level and on a very profitable mutual basis.

Japan

is second in the world after Canada, as a purchaser of U. S. exports.
The United States, in turn, takes something like 30 per cent of all
of Japan's exports.

Japanese industrial techniques, moreover, are

highly respected and the products of Japan's brilliant design are
currently very much in demand in the United States.
If I may digress, I can personally attest to the
great acceptability of these products.

My ears have become attuned

- 3 to the subtle difference between the ''putt-putt" of a Honda and
that of a Suzuki
Toyota.

an~

the "purr-purr 11 of a Datsun and that of a

These and other Japanese vehicles are to be found in con-

siderable numbers and are in great favor in most of the neighborhoods of the United States--except late at night.
Insofar as trade i.s concerned, then, any difficulties between Japan and the United States would seem to be more in
the nature of removable irritants rather than major headaches.

The

sum of Japanese-U. S. relations, however, is not calculated solely
on the computers of commerce.

Nor is the tone of the relationship

established only by the warm dialogues of groups such as this
Japanese-American Assembly.

The relationship, rather, reflects

the continuous flow of change within each nation and takes form in
the complex international politics of the Western Pacific and the
world.
Let me emphasize that the thoughts which I am about
to voice are those of one Senator of the United States.

I do not

speak for the Senate of the United States or any segment of its
Membership.

Nor do I speak for the President of the United States

even though we are of the same political party.
and only myself.

I speak for myself

But I speak freely and frankly, as a student, a

teacher and a Member of the Senate who has been deeply concerned
for many years with the problems of foreign relations.
In asserting this independence, I would not wish to
create the impression that the Senate is in constant conflict with
the Executive Branch of the United States government.

Seen from

this distance and through the prisms of the press that may sometimes
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The reality, however, is to the contrary.

The President of the United States and the Senate are in frequent
consultation and far more often than not, in agreement.

The United

States government, in short, proceeds most of the time, with its
component bodies moving in separate orbits but in substantial
harmony.

That is true in matters of foreign policy no less than

domestic policy.
I stress these systemic details, because I wish to
emphasize that I am not here to transmit the official views of the
United States government.

Only the President and his emissaries

are able to speak in that fashion.
here--as an interested person.

I am here as all of us are

I am here to express to you my

understanding, my concern and my hope for U. S.-Japanese relations.
I am here in the expectation of returning to the United States with
new and enriched insights into these relations.
With that as background, let me say first, that the
official U.S.-Japanese
at this time.

relationshipa~ars

to me to be satisfactory

If the bell does not ring perfectly in every

instanc~

nevertheless, it continues to ring with a certain mellowness of tone
I have already alluded to the value and mutuality of our commercial
contacts.

It can be noted, too, that our governments do not de-

nounce each other in communiques.

On the contrary, our diplomats

work together with civility and understanding.
Over the years these public servants who are at the
very tip of contact between the two nations have met their responsibilities with great energy, high skill and exceptional dedication.
We have been particularly fortunate in the caliber of the Ambassadors who have served both countries.

Professor Reischauer, for
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Administration and the Senate as one of the most effective representatives our country has ever sent abroad.

Ambassador Takeuchi,

who recently returned to Japan after a four year assignment was
greatly admired in the United States for, as was said in a Washington newspaper, "his good sense, good manners, and good diplomacy. "
The present Ambassadors, Mr. Johnson and Mr . Shimada, are the inheritors of an exemplary tradition to which they are in the process
of adding contributions.

An able diplomacy, then, has been a critical element
in fashioning the effective ties which exist between Japan and the
United States.

Over the years, it has been a diplomacy which has

faced difficulties in a temperate fashion.

It has been a diplomacy

which has devised timely adjustments of policies to meet these difficulties.
That kind of diplomacy is an imperative if the
quality of the U. S.-Japanese relationship is to endure in the new
situation which is emerging in the Western Pacific.
situation'' is not precisely the term.

Perhaps "new

What is transpiring in this

region, as I see it, is a reassertion of an historic situation in
up-to-date form.
The decisive element in the new situation is the reemergence of Japan.

Great material strength is, of course, a part

of this development.

The Japanese economy has displayed an extra-

ordinary dynamism which has already restored this nation to the
first rank of the industrialized nations of the world.
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An emergent Japanese leadership, I believe, derives a world-wide
acceptability from new and perceptive approaches to the rest of the
world and its needs.

These approaches may well have been forged in

the tragedy of World War II and tempered by the profound postwar
experiences of this nation.
In this context, Japan's enormous achievements in
every field of modern human endeavor have special relevance to the
old-new nations of Asia and to the entire world in the search for
human progress and a stable peace.

Japan is already making signi-

ficant contributions in the Asian Development Bank and the United
Nations and in other regional and world-wide organizations.

The

Japanese nation can play, if it so chooses, a part of even greater
importance, particularly in the process of integrating an economic
modernization with a responsible nationalism, within a framework of
multilateral cooperation.
The unfolding of the international capabilities of
Japan has coincided with a degree of redirection in the American
effort with respect to the underdeveloped nations.

There has been

a kind of dovetailing of adjustments as between Japanese and U.

s.

policies in connection with economic development, with the one rising towards its potential and the other falling from what has long
been, in my judgment, an abnormal level, particularly in this part
of the world.
There has also been a dovetailing of policies with
regard to the defense of the Western Pacific.

Over the years,

significant adjustments have been made in the largely unilateral
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It is

not so long ago, for example, that there we1e tens of thousands of
American soldiers quartered in every part of Japan.

It is not so

long ago, that these forces constituted the only military defense
of Japan. It is not so long ago, too, that this nation served as
of departure
a point;for massive American forces bound for the war in Korea.
As you know, all this has changed.

May I say that

it is a relief to the people of the United States that it is no
longer necessary to keep massive forces in Japan and I expect that
that is also a relief to the people of Japan.
Other changes of this kind will be made by an alert
diplomacy, I am sure, as the desirability is indicated.

With

respect to Okinawa, obviously, the need for an adjustment seems to
be coming to the surface at this time.
Before considering this question, let me stress the
urgency of keeping open minds on all aspects of the U.S.-Japanese
relationship if the open doors of essential cooperation are not to
close.

We must face change if changes are indicated in any and

every aspect of the relationship.

We must be prepared to face

changes before change is forced upon us by events.
The Okinawan problem, you will recall, arises from
the fact that certain clauses were left dangling, so to speak, in
the Peace Treaty of 1951 .

Those clauses involve not only the status

of the Ryukyus but also of the Bonins and Volcanos.

As I under-

stand the problem, there is no question that these territories are
Japanese within the meaning of the Peace Treaty.

A question arises,

however, as to the date--the timing--of the transfer of full authority from the United States to Japan.

A question also arises
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With regard to the Bonins and the Volcanos, let me
say that I am not aware of any circumstances so compelling as to
require an indefinite postponement of the liquidation of the Treaty
commitment.

There are no major U. S. military installations there

and strategic considerations do not appear to be involved in any
significant way.

In sum, there would appear to be no major blocks--

at least I know of none--to the restoration of the Bonins and the
Volcanos to Japan as required by the Peace Treaty.

It would appear,

moreover, that this piece of unfinished business of the Treaty could
be closed out not only without difficulties but also without delay.
I wish that the same might be said for Okinawa and
the Ryukyus.

Since there is a problem in this connection, it seems

to me that a full consideration of the situation is in order.

The

absence of frank exchange of views, in the open, on Okinawa has
given rise to rumors and inneundos.

These hints seem to me to

distort the motives of the United States and certainly do not contribute to the cordiality of U. s.-Japanese relations.
It has been said, for example, that the United States
clings to the Ryukyus because of the war in Viet Nam.

Of course,

Okinawa is of importance to the United States in this connection.
We have over half-a-million men involved in Southeast Asia.

Our

military installations on Okinawa serve as one source of supply for
these forces, and we are determined that these men shall not lack
supplies.

That is not to say that there are no alternative ways

by which their needs may be met.

In my judgment, therefore, it is

quite i naccurate to ascribe the problem of Okinawa to Viet Nam.
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desires to use the Ryukyus as some sort of bargaining chit in the ex

tension of the Japanese-U. S. Defense Treaty.

I do not know whether

the Defense Treaty will be modified a few years hence and, if so, in
what way.
It should be obvious, however, that the American
government would not be so crass as to use the well-being of the
people of the Ryukyus for some vague bargaining purposes in connection with the review of the Treaty.

What could be sought and ob-

tained by that course which would be of significant value to the
United States?

The assertion that the U. S. will seek to bend the

Japanese viewpoint in treaty revision with the lever of Okinawa is
as uninformed as it is unfounded.

Even the thought that such could

be the case is out of harmony with the entire character of JapaneseU. S. relations during the past few years.
To be sure, there are difficulties with regard to the
return of the Ryukyus.

They involve, however, not transitory con-

siderations or base motives but very fundamental questions.

These

questions have to do with the uncertainty of the general security
needs in the Western Pacific in the years ahead.

They have to do

with Japan's safety no less than that of the United States and other
Asian-Pacific nations.

They have to do with the relevance, today,

of the defense concepts which prevailed at the time of the signing
of the Japanese-U. S. Defense Treaty a decade and a half ago.

They

have to do with the nature of the American role in the Western
Pacific in the decade or decades ahead--with what is expected of us
by Japan and others as a defense contribution in this region.
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be only in an inertia of intellect, that we would fail to grasp the
significant differences in the Western Pacific today as compared
with 15 years ago or even ten or five.

Consider for a moment the

change in the very positioning of American military power.
years ago, as I have already noted,

u. s.

Fifteen

strength was concentrated

largely in Japan and it had converged with a great force of men and
equipment on the peninsula of Korea.

Where is it now?

there are still points of power north of Okinawa.

To be sure,

But the focus of

the U. S. military role in the Western Pacific has shifted south to
Viet Nam at the other end of the Asian littoral.
Consider, too, the extraordinary change in the character of relations between China and the Soviet Union.

You will

recall that these two nations signed a Defense Treaty in 1950 on
the basis of unbreakable Communist solidarity and an implacable
hostility towards the United States and Japan.

Today, the fury of

Peking comes down--as the rain--impartially upon the Soviet Union
o.r. d the United States.

Today, the monolith of Sino-Soviet relations

which stood until Stalin's death lies shattered by border quarrels
and by ideological and other clashes between the two great mainland
powers.

Yet only a few years ago, it was commonly believed that,

t hrough communism, Russia had fastened a permanent yoke on the
Cn inese people.

The fact is that there is not even a common ideology

within China, much less one which binds the Chinese forever in subservience to the Russians.
I cite the disintegrative characteristics of ~e~
0 V\ \'I 0.. .s Q. ~'o.Q.\l)V'.
Chinese situation and the Sino-Soviet relationshipA~ 11i~8 8MY
)
}'leaelir'iil

I am not at all sure what consequences will flow from

them in the end.

Rather I make reference to them because they are
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profound elements in the changing situation in the Western Pacific.
In a similar vein, I would note certain constructive adjustments
which are taking place in this region.

There is, for example, the

more balanced view of Japan which has developed in Moscow and appeared to be developing in Peking at least until the outbreak of the
current inner difficulties in China.

There is the complementary ef-

fort of Japan to build bridges to its mainland neighbors.

Together

the two adjustments have produced an impressive increase in contact
between China and Japan and between the Soviet Union and Japan,
particularly in the realm of commerce.
If I am not mistaken, China now ranks fourth in the
world in Japan's foreign trade with a current total volume of about
$600 million.

With respect to the Soviet Union, it is my understand-

ing that not only is there a very substantial and growing Japanese
trade but the general tone of the relationship has so improved that
it has become feasible even to contemplate a joint Soviet-Japanese
development of the natural resources of Sakhalin and Siberia.
These new trends have emerged from what was, just a
few years ago, a sea of fear between Japan and the Northeast Asian
mainland.

They would appear to herald the return of more normal

relationships in this region.

Normal, in the sense in whi ch it is

used would involve the return of Japan, China and the Soviet Union
to the center of the stage, so to speak, in the affairs of the
Western Pacific.

In view of the history of this region, it should

not be surprising if this inner triangular relationship should be
reasserted.
Indeed, it would be my hope that the changes which
are appearing in this connection will permit the role of the United
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States in this region also to be scaled to more normal dimensions.
The United States did not seek the massive role in which we have
found ourselves in the Western Pacific for so many years.

Rather

it was the exigencies of World War II and its aftermath which thrust
us deeply into this region.

A restoration of a more stable situa-

tion as between China and Japan and Japan and the Soviet Union would
appear to me to be helpful to the United States in the adjustment of
its own position.
At this point, however, we still do not know whether
the developments which I have been discussing foreshadow a more
stable situation in the Western Pacific.

We still do not know whethe

they foreshadow a situation in which the demands on U. S. military
power in this region can be reduced.
There are, in any event, no certain responses to such
questions.

There can only be sound judgments.

It seems to me that

Japan and the United States should come together to try to make joint
calculations respecting these developments.

It seems to me that the

two nations should do so without undue delay, on behalf of their
common security and the peace of the Western Pacific.
Such calculations would also have relevance to the
problem of the Ryukyus.

That is not to say that security calcula-

tions are especially pertinent to the non-military aspects of this
question.

I cannot see, for example, that it is necessary to clarify

the ambiguities of the Sino-Soviet dispute, in order to give consideration to the possibilities of a restoration of Japanese jurisdic
tion over islands in the Ryukyus, other than Okinawa.

Nor do I see

that we have to be assured that the fragile new bridges which stretch
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stand for all times in order to give consideration to Japanese partj
cipation in the administration of the civilian affairs of Okinawa,
provided we bear in mind the great necessity for safeguarding the
effectiveness of the military installations which are located there.
As I have suggested, however, the ultimate disposition of the Okinawa question does involve a sober and joint estimate
of the significance of major developments and changes in the Western
Pacific.

An estimate of that kind, in turn, requires a better under

standing of Soviet intentions in the Northeast Pacific.

It requires

a better understanding of the upheavals within China and their
relevance not only for the Sino-Soviet Defense Treaty of 1950 but
also for the Japanese-U.S. Defense Treaty.

It requires, finally,

a better understanding of nuclear development in China and the prospects for curbing by agreement the grave risks which are posed by
nuclear weapons to the Western Pacific and the world.
One would expect that our joint understanding of
these matters would be improved in connection with review of the
Japanese-U. S. Defense Treaty a few years hence.
necessary to sit on our hands until that time.

However, it is not
It occurs to me that

the problem of Okinawa itself provides a sufficient basis for beginning now a joint consideration of the security questions of the
Western Pacific.

It occurs to me, too, that consideration might

also be given to inviting the Soviet Union to join with the United
States and Japan in joint examination of these questions.

Would

not tripartite discussions of this kind be of value in clarifying
them?

Indeed, I should think even that quadripartite meetings, to

.

..

~
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at this time on the Chinese mainiand.
The illumination which would be provided by tripartite
discussions of Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States might
help to provide a more rapid conclusion of the Ryukyus question.
One would hope that it m ght also hasten a final resolution of the
question of Etorofu and Kunashiri and of Shikotan and the Habomais.
In sum,a tripartite meeting might speed the liquidation of all
vestiges of the unfinished business of World War II and give more
durable form to the peace of the Pacific.

And may I add, two de-

cades after, that it is about time.
I make the suggestion to an American-Japanese discussion group that there might well be three-way discussions of
problems of the Western Pacific which would include the Soviet Union
because I am confident that the Japanese and the Americans here
share a hope for the peace of the Pacific.

I am confident, too,

that we share a realization of our obligation, as human beings, to
work together through our respective nations and with all other
nations for that peace and for world peace, to the end that there
shall be no end to the civilized experience on this planet.

